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The following is the transcript of a secret address delivered
by the Holy Leader to the Supreme War Council late in
the year 2007.
In the name of The One Above, I offer greetings tomy fellow warriors! Today, with His grace, I speakof our great victory over our most evil enemy,
America. A little more than 10 years ago experts
thought that what became known as the Revolution in
Military Affairs would leave developing nations like
ours incapable of opposing a high-tech power like the
United States. With the help of The One Above, we
proved them wrong. They were guilty, as those who
defy the sayings of the divine usually are, of idolatry—
though in this case they did not worship graven
images, but the silicon chip. As though a speck of sand
could defeat the will of The One Above.
At the heart of the “revolution in military affairs”
were the amazing new technologies that Americans
believed “would make cyberwar and information war
the distinguishing feature of future conflict,” as one of
their experts, Richard Szafranski, put it in 1995. 
American thinking about the revolution in mili-
tary affairs was based on grand visions of long-distance
wars—push-button conflicts against cybernetically
inferior foes. Once again, the Americans neglected to
study history’s many examples of supposedly out-
matched combatants prevailing over better-equipped
rivals. And they took it for granted that their potential
adversaries would accept the American interpretation
of this “revolution.”
But America’s most likely opponents were invari-
ably unlike America and thus not beholden to the
American interpretation. The late 20th and early 21st
century saw the reemergence of what British historian
John Keegan called “warrior” societies. Like us, they
are “brought up to fight, think fighting honorable, and
think killing in warfare glorious.” A warrior in such
societies, Keegan wrote, “prefers death to dishonor
and kills without pity when he gets the chance.” The
Americans ignored a warning from one of their own,
Maj. Ralph Peters, who wrote in 1994 that the “new
warrior class already numbers in the millions.” Peters
wrote that:
[America] will often face [warriors] who have acquired a
taste for killing, who do not behave rationally according
to our definition of rationality, who are capable of atroc-
ities that challenge the descriptive powers of language,
and who will sacrifice their own kind in order to sur-
vive.
Too many Americans assumed that warrior soci-
eties like ours lacked the sophistication to integrate
new technology into a war-making doctrine that could
defeat the United States. They neglected those, like
Donald E. Ryan, who cautioned that “even technologi-
cally backward societies have a nasty habit of devising
strategies to offset [America’s] high-tech superiority.”
Moreover, that “superiority” was never as great as
the Americans hoped. The cyberscience that fueled
the “revolution” did not require the mature infrastruc-
tures needed to produce traditional war-fighting plat-
forms like ships, planes, and tanks. With such plat-
forms the First World’s military power once dominat-
ed global affairs. Information technology changed all
that, because its requirements were far less demand-
ing: Small numbers of people working with commer-
cially available computers could perform more than
adequate high-tech research and development.
Furthermore, Americans increasingly relied upon
commercial, off-the-shelf cybertechnology. We could
acquire the same products on international markets—
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and often more quickly than the bureaucratic Ameri-
cans, fettered as they were by complex contracting
rules and regulations. Though the Americans claimed
that information technology would allow them to get
inside an enemy’s “decision loop,” the irony was that
we repeatedly got inside their ‘acquisition loop’ and
deployed newer systems before they finished buying
already obsolescent ones. With the advent of off-the-
shelf armaments, the American military no longer
possessed a monopoly on the most advanced weaponry
available. 
Americans also underestimated the effect of rapid-
ly declining cyber-costs—for, as George Gilder accu-
rately predicted, in the year
2000 we could purchase silicon
chips for $100 with as much
power as the $320 million
defense supercomputers of the
early 1990s. The Americans dis-
covered this when they sought
to use information warfare to
corrupt and destroy our com-
mand and control systems. The
effort proved futile because
many communications devices
became so inexpensive and
miniaturized that our armed
forces could afford to make
them ubiquitous and redun-
dant. It was virtually impossible
for cyber-assaults to negate
them all. In the end, attacking
these proliferating methods of
communication typically made
as much sense as using a laser-
guided missile to disable the
rifle of an individual soldier.
W ORSE YET FOR THE AMERICANS, ADVANCES INcomputer software eroded the demand for high-
ly trained specialists to operate complex weapons.
Easy-to-learn graphic displays allowed poorly educat-
ed soldiers to quickly master elaborate but user-friend-
ly war-fighting machines, rather like a 15-year-old
American figuring out how to dispense Coca-Cola at a
fast-food restaurant by pressing the right pictograph.
Praise The One Above, the microchip ended the edu-
cational and training advantage the American military
had enjoyed.
Because the Americans believed their information
technologies reduced the need for conventional com-
bat forces, they disbanded such forces in favor of
trendy “information” units. These were filled not with
well-trained, physically fit combatants, but rather, as
Szafranski put it, “mind-nimble (not necessarily liter-
ate), fingertip-quick youth” who tended to equate their
success at video games with competency to engage in
real war. Thank The One Above, the easy capture of a
few of these self-styled “digital warriors” yielded a
treasure trove of intelligence data.
We found we could contend with the light, suppos-
edly high-tech combat units that completed most of
America’s remaining battle forces. Since we no longer
had to concentrate our forces to oppose the now-de-
funct armored formations that dominated the First
Gulf War, we took our cue from
methods used by the North
Vietnamese against the Ameri-
cans and dispersed our army in-
to small, mobile combat teams
that combined only when
required to strike a common
objective. Not only did this
make our troops harder to find,
it also forced the Americans to
expend their limited number of
precision weapons on what were
often tiny groups of soldiers.
In any event, we decided not
to worry too much if we could
not always match the high-tech
equipment of the U.S. military.
We consoled ourselves with the
knowledge that reliance on cy-
bersystems was not an unquali-
fied virtue. The prescient Ryan
noted that “technologically ad-
vanced, information-intensive
military organizations are more
vulnerable to information warfare simply because they
are information dependent.” Besides, our technical
deficiencies inspired us to innovation—approaches
overlooked by the gadgetry-obsessed Americans.
For example, we viewed the technology-spurred
globalization of the news industry as a means of mak-
ing war. By the mid-1990s, international news organi-
zations using the latest electronic wizardry no longer
had to depend on government help in war zones.
Operational security became impossible as news
groups launched information-gathering and commu-
nications satellites, monitored proliferating Internet
transmissions, gave their reporters self-contained com-
munications suites, and even flew their own un-
manned aerial reconnaissance vehicles to transmit
real-time views of battle areas. 
Iss. 19/Jan. 29 well  10/10/02 7:34 PM  Page 3
This phenomenally valuable information was, of
course, available to us. We had no need to build costly
satellites or even pay spies; instead, we could rely on
the free flow of data, because the Americans rarely
achieved the necessary political consensus to interfere
with these modern “news-gathering” techniques. Fur-
thermore, whatever patriotic or legalistic pressure the
Americans could bring to bear on their domestic news
people was wholly ineffective against scoop-hungry
foreign reporters.
In fact, the technology-empowered media made
“information equality,” not “information dominance,”
the key to the “revolution in military affairs.” For
example, when the U.S. tried their pathetic cyber-
based psychological operations to mislead our people,
the world press quickly exposed the American deceit. 
We agreed with those, like George J. Stein, who
said that information warfare “is fundamentally not
about satellites, wires, and comput-
ers. It is about influencing human
beings and the decisions they
make.” And we were confident we
could influence the American pub-
lic and its poll-sensitive decision-
makers. Studying the Vietnam con-
flict, we were heartened by the
remarks of a former North Viet-
namese commander, Bui Tin:
Support for the war from our rear was
completely secure while the American
rear was vulnerable. . . . The con-
science of America was part of its war-
making capability, and we were turning that power in
our favor. America lost because of its democracy;
through dissent and protest it lost the ability to mobi-
lize a will to win. 
Our strategy was to make warfare so psychological-
ly costly that the Americans would lose their “will to
win.” To do so we freed ourselves from the decadent
West’s notions of legal and moral restraint. And why
not? Their so-called “laws of wars” were conceived by
the First World to keep our people oppressed. Further-
more, their “law” presented no deterrent because the
West demonstrated over and over that it lacked the
conviction to enforce it. No, my friends, The One
Above called upon us to use every tactic to defeat the
cyberscience that the Americans thought would make
them so superior. We would rather be feared than
respected.
With that in mind, we found that the radical
changes in news gathering and reporting allowed us to
develop a strategy to exploit America’s growing fear of
casualties. We carefully noted how this obsession
enabled far weaker adversaries to defeat the so-called
“superpower.” The deaths of 18 American soldiers in
Somalia—followed by the telecast of a U.S. soldier’s
body dragged through Mogadishu’s streets—caused a
public outcry that forced a humiliated America to for-
sake its policy objectives. Similarly, the specter of casu-
alties was enough to delay intervention in Bosnia in
the 1990s despite the occurrence of outright genocide.
The exasperated columnist George Will wrote that the
“West . . . almost preens about having become too
exquisitely sensitive to use force against barbarism.”
Thus, it became part of our strategy to capitalize on
television’s power to influence decisionmakers by aim-
ing to wage war in the most brutish—and public—
way. This strategy fit our warrior nation well. Coun-
tries such as ours, organized as they are around excep-
tionally powerful ethnic, religious, or cultural forces
and frequently endowed with potent internal security
forces, are much more resistant to
vacillations in public opinion than are
the diverse, pluralistic democracies of
the West. Because our people truly
believed in America’s wickedness, it
was not necessary to hide our ferocity.
Rather, we used ruthless tactics open-
ly to intimidate the American people
and break their resolve.
The “revolution in military
affairs” did not, therefore, make war-
fare less murderous; war never devel-
oped into the almost genteel electron-
ic exchange that some foresaw. To the
contrary, with our strategy it became more savage than
ever—at least in the eyes of the many Americans who
in previous conflicts had been spared the unedited,
real-time “virtual” battlefield presence that the new
communication nets allowed. Families at home could
now watch and hear their loved ones die.
SUCH HIDEOUS EXPERIENCES DESTROYED predic-tions of “non-lethal” conflicts made by over-enthu-
siastic cyberprophets. Those absurd forecasts, com-
bined with the memory of a nearly casualty-free First
Gulf War, caused many Americans to conclude erro-
neously that the occurrence of any casualties was
irrefutable proof that a campaign was inherently
flawed and should, therefore, be abandoned.
We expected that the U.S. would try to wage this
supposedly “bloodless” war by assaulting us from afar
with cyberarms. Only the soft, convenience-loving
West would think that the loss of electrical power or
phone service would stop us. Techno-offensives that








savage than ever. 
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cripple civilian systems do not deter us. After all, our
people are accustomed to far worse. 
To counteract the effectiveness of cyber-attacks on
our military forces, we trained them to operate
autonomously if normal communications were cut.
We used runners, low-tech signaling devices, and even
coded statements of our leaders, broadcast on interna-
tional news programs, to coordinate actions until con-
tact was restored. As a last resort, our forces struck pre-
planned targets, martyring themselves in the process
when necessary. Our primary aim, after all, was simply
to cause casualties among the Americans.
We knew we would have that chance. The Ameri-
cans eventually had to use
troops to try to dislodge us
because even in the 21st centu-
ry, as Bevin Alexander put it in
1995, “victory comes from
human beings moving into ene-
my territory and taking
charge.” Nothing else succeeds
in conflicts waged against war-
riors of our zealotry. We antici-
pated, however, that the U.S.
would first attempt to weaken
us with its airpower.
Our analysis showed that we
could not stop their high-tech
aircraft from hitting anywhere
in our country. To find a way to
protect our key facilities, we
once again examined history
and recalled how Somali gun-
men had effectively used their
wives and children as human
shields. We also remembered
that after the uproar following
the bombing of the Al Firdos bunker during the First
Gulf War, when hundreds of Iraqi civilians died in an
attack on what the Americans mistakenly believed to
be a command center, very few strikes occurred
against Baghdad. The Americans feared—rightly, we
believe—that the spectacle of their pilots killing
“innocent” civilians would be too much for their pub-
lic (and world opinion) to bear. 
Since our doctrine called upon us to present the
Americans with moral conundrums that would com-
plicate their efforts to attack us, we fully integrated our
military infrastructure into civilian areas. We buried
major command posts and logistics bases below
schools, hospitals, apartment complexes, and even
places of worship. Our most vital facilities were built
underneath POW camps.
We saw how Serb forces back in the 1990s success-
fully countered NATO’s sophisticated airpower by
chaining U.N. hostages to targets. We also observed
how rebel Chechens took 2,000 hostages at Budyon-
novsk and cowed the Russians into meeting their
demands. Accordingly, hostage-taking also became an
important part of our “revolution in military affairs.”
In full view of the world media, we shackled captives
to vital structures and openly bound them to tanks
and military vehicles. We even put some on air trans-
ports and helicopters!
In order to create diplomatic pressure on the Unit-
ed States, we took lots of hostages from other nations,
even neutrals. We used them to
coerce their governments into
allowing us access to essential
international satellites and com-
munications centers, while
denying the same to the Ameri-
cans. We also made a concerted
effort to take hostages from mil-
itarily weak nations so that
America would not gain valu-
able allies. Time and again our
efforts earned a bonus: Ameri-
ca—for political reasons—was
obliged to accept new “allies”
whose logistical requirements
and marginal fighting ability
made them more of a burden
than a help.
W E CONSTANTLY LOOKEDFOR IMAGINATIVE WAYS to
turn our technological short-
comings into decisive strengths.
With material and expertise gleaned from govern-
ments hostile to the U.S., as well as help from crimi-
nals in the former Soviet Union, we were able to
assemble a handful of crude nuclear devices by 2006.
But America’s powerful information-technology
weapons left us without a reliable way to deliver The
Bomb. Their F-22 fighters, theater missile defenses,
and ultra-modern hunter-killer submarines were sys-
tems we could not realistically overcome. Ultimately,
however, we found a way to use our nuclear weapons
against America.
Many of you have confused expressions on your
faces. You are thinking: “It was the Americans, not we,
who used nuclear weapons in the Great War.” Yes, our
Military City was destroyed by an atomic attack that
killed 30,000 of our people. Sadly, it was the Will of
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The One Above. But my friends, it was not an Ameri-
can weapon that exploded. It was our own.
I will explain. In warrior cultures such as ours
nothing is more glorious than dying in battle. For us
and for many non-Western peoples, martyrdom and
self-sacrifice are cultural totems more valued than self-
preservation. Accordingly, we allowed the people of
our Military City the honor of dying for our cause. It
was the Will of The One Above.
Shortly before the start of the war, we deployed a
nuclear device to the Military City hidden in an ambu-
lance (protected from air attack by its red crosses).
Next, we induced the Americans to strike by con-
structing a genuine biological warfare laboratory in
the heart of the City—realizing, of course, that their
state-of-the-art intelligence sensors would easily iden-
tify it.
Predictably, the Americans
sent their stealthful F-117
bombers and cruise missiles
against the laboratory. Several
journalists reported the progress
of the raid on live TV. Just as the
Americans dropped their bombs,
we secretly detonated our atomic
weapon. The spectacular fireball
vaporized everything for miles,
all to the horror of a global broad-
cast audience numbering in the
hundreds of millions.
The world reaction to what
was thought to be an American first-use of nuclear
weapons was universal condemnation. The Japanese
were especially appalled. Not only did they cease con-
tributing to the effort against us, they also began sys-
tematically to withdraw billions of dollars invested in
American bonds. U.S. financial markets panicked, and
the American economy fell into chaos. Other impor-
tant members of the world community turned against
America as well.
Of course, the United States vigorously claimed
innocence. But few believed its government, even
among the nation’s own people. Clearly, Americans
had grown so cynical of their government that they
were quite willing to believe it capable of anything.
POLITICAL DISSENT SOON BURNED AT THE FABRICof American society, and we managed to inflame
that controversy even more. We told the press that we
would take reprisals against American POWs for the
nuclear “attack.” As you know, this was the first major
war in which America deployed large numbers of
female combat soldiers. To carry out our plan, our
fighters captured a few dozen.
The Americans believed that their nation could
endure the sight of women as POWs. Perhaps they
were right. Whatever the case, America was shocked
by what we did next: We used our infamous Boys
Brigade to rape the women, and then to amputate their
limbs and burn their faces. Though we let them suffer
terribly, we were careful not to kill them. We told the
world that our women suffered much more in the
atomic catastrophe.
The events surrounding the 50th anniversary of
the destruction of Hiroshima taught us that the con-
demnations would be few. We saw how many people—
including plenty of Americans—overlooked Japanese
atrocities during World War II to castigate the Ameri-
can use of The Bomb to end the war. We likewise por-
trayed ourselves as nuclear “victims”
and gained a surprising amount of
sympathy despite our acts against the
prisoners.
We then returned the POWs to the
Americans—we said it was a “human-
itarian” gesture. We converted the
repatriation into what they called a
“media circus.” In no way did we try
to hide what we did; to the contrary,
we advertised it—using video clips on
the Internet—as a warning of things
to come.
However prepared the Americans
thought they were to see their daughters come back in
body bags, they were not ready to see them returned
home strapped to wheelchairs, horribly mutilated, and
shrieking in agony.
TRAUMATIZED RELATIVES FRANTICALLY DEMANDEDthe removal of their wives and daughters from the
combat zone, and those demands were swiftly met. But
by 2007, women had become so incorporated into the
structure of the U.S. military that their sudden with-
drawal wrecked the effectiveness of the deployed
forces.
As successful as this strategy was, we still wanted to
strike the American homeland. This was not easy. By
the turn of the century, America had developed fairly
sophisticated methodologies to protect their critical
military and civilian computer systems from cyber-
subversion. Of course, we hired the best hackers
around the world to challenge the American safe-
guards. Although they enjoyed some success, this was
really a diversion.
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We knew that direct cyber-attack could not do the
kind of damage necessary to defeat the United States.
Adopting B.H. Liddell Hart’s strategy of the indirect
approach, however, led us to concentrate our efforts
against America’s soft underbelly, Mexico. The Mexi-
can economy depended upon computers, but its
machines were not as protected as those in the U.S. 
Our hackers were able to disrupt and corrupt them
on a massive scale. At the same time, we used modern
document technologies to print billions in near-per-
fect counterfeit pesos to further sabotage the economy.
Finally, our clandestine assistance re-ignited the sim-
mering Zapatista revolt in Chiapas. 
The synergistic effect of
these schemes was devastating.
The Mexican government col-
lapsed and the economy disinte-
grated. Millions of refugees
flooded the United States,
prompting desperate calls for
military assistance to control
the influx. Angry Americans
loudly objected to troops fight-
ing thousands of miles away
when a crisis existed quite liter-
ally in their own backyard. Our
plan, thanks to The One Above,
worked perfectly. 
We developed additional
methods of bringing the war
home to America. Naturally, we
used terror bombings, but we
prudently avoided traditional
targets. In the last 10 years
industrialized countries have
perfected security techniques
that make attacks against
defended facilities very difficult. So we chose a more
exposed target: America’s swelling population of polit-
ically influential elderly. We planted bombs in elder-
care facilities, public parks, medical centers—any-
where we thought they would gather. Soon, frightened
seniors joined the burgeoning antiwar movement.
Our search for other low-tech ways of attacking
America drew us to environmental warfare. We waged
it against U.S. agriculture because agriculture was vir-
tually unprotected and within our means to strike.
Our proxies spread destructive Mediterranean fruit
flies throughout growing areas in California and Flori-
da, and introduced various plant funguses and blights
into Midwest grain crops. We also secretly inoculated
farm animals with highly contagious diseases.
We used the indirect approach again by attacking
other vulnerable targets outside the United States. For
example, our agents set huge fires in equatorial rain
forests, raising fears in ecologically conscious America
that the world’s oxygen supply would be jeopardized.
From inside our own borders we attacked the ozone
layer by releasing damaging chemicals into the atmos-
phere. Of course, we did not concern ourselves with
the effects of these actions on our own people because
our faith told us that The One Above would protect
us.
We bragged about our responsibility for all these
deeds, staggering Americans with our willingness to
attack them in every conceivable way. By the grace of
The One Above there was no
method of warfare that we failed
to consider: We left AIDS-
infected needles on bathing
beaches and polluted America’s
coastlines by scuttling oil
tankers we covertly hired.
Americans could not enjoy a
meal, relax on a beach, or even
breathe the air without wonder-
ing if they were about to
become victims of yet another
of our assaults. Just as we
destroyed their confidence in
government, we destroyed their
trust in nature.
YOU KNOW THE REST, MYFRIENDS. THOUGH WE
rarely defeated the Americans
on the battlefield, we were able
to inflict such punishment that
they were soon pleading for
peace at any price. With their economy in ruins, their
borders compromised, their people demoralized, and
civil unrest everywhere, they could not continue. We
had broken their will! They had no choice but to leave
us with the lands we conquered and the valuable
resources they contain.
Of the many mistakes the U.S. made in adapting to
the “revolution in military affairs,” several stand out:
America too often assumed that the revolution would
favor technologically advanced nations like herself.
She failed to consider how enemies with values and
philosophies utterly at odds with hers might conduct
war in the information age. Despite what many tech-
nology-infatuated strategists thought in 1995, cyber-
science cannot elimi nate the vicious cruelty inherent
in human conflict. We taught the Americans that no
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Anyone could see that Barbara Hendricks wasnot the best choice to sing Le temps des cerises atthe Place de la Bastille in tribute to the late
president of France, François Mitterrand. The choice
was poor not for political reasons, but because the
singer was bound to perform in her usual operatic
style. Le temps des cerises—“Cherry Season,” a lovely,
nostalgic, 19th-century song that somehow became an
unofficial anthem of the French left—is the antithesis
of opera. It has to be sung simply, without vocal lush-
ness, the way Yves Montand once sang it on television.
Hendricks could no more pull that off than Pavarotti
could sing “Tambourine Man” in Bob Dylan’s style.
In fact, Hendricks herself was conscious of the
problem and would have preferred to sing Schubert’s
Ave Maria. But the rally at the Place de la Bastille—in
front of the Bastille Opera House, one of Mitterrand’s
regal adornments of postmodern Paris—was a leftist
gathering, and the French left is studiously secular. So
no hymns, only sad, romantic songs, as thousands of
people gathered in the rain, many of them holding a
single crimson rose, the emblem of the Socialist party.
Almost 15 years earlier, on May 10, 1981, when
Mitterrand was first elected president, the same peo-
ple, or perhaps their parents, had gathered at the same
spot to celebrate with music and dancing. Mitterrand
had gone on to reign for 14 years, longer than any oth-
er president of the Fifth Republic including Charles
de Gaulle. Indeed, he had been reelected handsomely
in 1988 against a then-naive Jacques Chirac. But just
how Socialist a president had Mitterrand been? The
people assembled at La Bastille knew the answer:
They were orphans, not just because their leader was
gone, but because their dreams were gone as well.
As it turned out, the Bastille rally was only one of
many memorial observances and not the crowning
ceremony as might have been expected. The former
president passed away on the morning of Monday,
January 8. President Chirac delivered an emotional
eulogy on television that night. The Bastille rally was
on Wednesday night. The funeral took place at Jarnac,
Mitterrand’s birthplace on the Atlantic coast of
France, on Thursday morning. Mitterrand had
requested a simple funeral. It was not as simple as all
that. There were troops, and flags, and honors. Barri-
ers were duly erected to separate the family and their
numerous Parisian guests from the local populace.
Moreover, in what amounted to a complete disavowal
of the secular mood at La Bastille, there was a mass at
the Catholic parish church. At about the same time,
President Chirac was attending a requiem mass at
Notre Dame cathedral in Paris. He then hosted a state
dinner for foreign heads of state and government at
the Elysée palace. All in all, the observances were more
right-wing than left-wing in tone. The pomp and sym-
bols of traditional France had eclipsed the comrades’
mourning—an ironic reflection of the way Mitterrand
had lived his life.
François Mitterrand was born in 1916 to conserva-
tive Catholic parents. He was sent to a Catholic private
school. In his early twenties, as a student, he flirted
with the royalists and other far-right agitators. There
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computer wages war with the exquisite finality of a
simple bayonet thrust.
Most critically, America failed to deal decisively
with barbarism when confronted by it. Had she
demonstrated the will to face her responsibilities as a
superpower in the post-Cold War world, nations like
ours might not have dared oppose her—we keenly
understand brute force and its consequences.
Now the Americans beg for our scraps. So desper-
ate are they that they send their children here to be
our servants. We control their future! That is the price
of defeat! This, my friends, is the ultimate meaning of
the Revolution in Military Affairs! Let us praise The
One Above! ♦
JANUARY 29, 1996
Michel Gurfinkiel is editor in chief of the French conservative
weekly Valeurs Actuelles.
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